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The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions
and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into mar-
ketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semi-
public contest, that has been neglected by the economic literature but
exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can miti-
gate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity and
specify the general requirements for situations in which a semi-public con-
test can increase welfare. This paper’s results suggest that governments
promote knowledge about the semi-public contest mechanism but refrain
from direct public funding of contests.
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1 Introduction
To foster innovation two main ingredients are necessary: new inventions and
institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable inno-
vations (Scotchmer, 2004). This paper proposes a new institution that has been
neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. It shows
how this institution, called a semi-public contest, can mitigate a dilemma that
arises at a very early stage of innovative activity.
I analyze a situation where entrepreneurs, who can be interpreted as inven-
tors endowed with project ideas of uncertain value, have to be matched with
investors, each of whom owns financial resources and has the relevant exper-
tise to innovate but lacks ideas. Matching is modeled as an auction, where
entrepreneurs sell their projects to investors, who bid for them. If matching is
not preceded by screening of the project quality, all investors will have the same
expectation and, thus, compete away any profit to be made in bidding. More-
over, if investors have to bear a market entry cost before bidding, the zero profit
from the auction may be insufficient to attract market entry. Conversely, if an
investor screens an entrepreneur’s project and gains inside information on the
project value, the entrepreneur may expect that the investor will use his superior
information when bidding and will extract some profit from the entrepreneur.
This is related to a hold-up problem. Moreover, as entrepreneurs bear a cost for
developing projects, the expected profit reduction can deter the development of
innovations and, thus, reduce welfare. In this paper I model a mechanism (or
institution) that exists in practice and can mitigate this dilemma.
According to this mechanism, an investor outsources screening to a jury of
experts that produces a ranking of projects voluntarily entered by entrepreneurs.
Participation is costly for both sides. The values of the winning projects are
publicized by the jury, which creates symmetric information amongst investors
on the winners’ project values. Thus, winners expect high bids for their projects
and they earn a reputation, whose value grows in the level of competitiveness
of the contest. The project values of contest losers, however, remain exclusive
inside information of the contest sponsor.
Why would an investor sponsor a contest that exhibits a positive externality,
as the sponsor pays all screening costs but competing investors also learn the
values of winners’ projects? The answer is that the sponsor benefits from exclu-
sive inside information on contest losers, allowing better informed bids on their
projects. By publicizing the identity of winners he reduces his payoff compared
to exclusive private screening. But he creates an incentive for entrepreneurs
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to participate in the contest because they strive for the reputation and high
payoff in case of winning. Thus, the sponsor is better off in equilibrium. His
main trade-off arises when he determines the number of winning slots in his
contest. If he increases this number, his contest becomes more attractive for
entrepreneurs, which is especially important if other contests are set up by com-
peting investors. If he reduces the number of winning slots, ceteris paribus his
contest produces more losers and, thus, increases the number of projects the
sponsor has inside information about.
Although the institution is new to the economic literature, semi-public con-
tests are frequent phenomena in practice. For instance, a relatively new form
of startup financing has appeared since the 1980s. Venture capital firms and
business angels have joined with universities to attract ideas for new busi-
nesses through business plan competitions. In a business plan competition, en-
trepreneurs prepare and submit a complete business plan, including the descrip-
tion of their product or process idea, the target market, the management team,
strategy, marketing, financial planning, etc.1 Business plans are screened by
a jury of experts, often encompassing venture capitalists, consultants, lawyers,
public accountants, and business professors. The most promising business ideas
are declared winners and, hence, earn a high reputation and exposure to in-
vestors, some of whom (from diverse industries) sponsor the contest. Section
4 of this paper outlines the key features of the “Moot Corp Competition”, the
world’s first business plan competition for MBA students, and shows how they
are reflected by the model’s assumptions and findings.2
I show that, if investors face competition and if the expected value of the
reputation created by publicizing the winners is sufficiently high compared to
the screening cost of investors and entrepreneurs, both sides are motivated to
participate in a semi-public contest. In deciding this, an entrepreneur trades
off the expected benefit of winning the contest against the cost he incurs during
the screening and the expected loss in bidding in case of losing the contest.
I also show that in equilibrium only one investor sponsors a given semi-public
1See http://www.mit100k.org/ for several resources on how to write a business plan.
The same website writes about the “MIT $100K Entrepreneurship Competition” that it “has
facilitated the birth of over 120 companies with aggregate exit values of $2.5 billion captured
and a market cap of over $10 billion. These companies have generated over 2,500 jobs and
received $700 million dollars in Venture Capital funding.”
2Other applications comprise TV casting shows for would-be pop stars such as “American
Idol” (see section 4); talent competitions among young artists, software developers, or classi-
cal musicians (see Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2003); architecture competitions; and industry
sponsored project grants for researchers or graduates.
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contest. Sponsoring is exclusive because the sponsor prefers not to share the
inside information on losers’ types, despite the potential to share screening costs
with other investors. The market for semi-public contests has characteristics
of a natural monopoly. I specify the conditions under which a monopolistic
contest exists in equilibrium. Moreover, depending on parameter realizations,
it is possible that several contests are organized simultaneously and compete
for entrepreneurs’ participation. I show, however, that in equilibrium every
entrepreneur will not participate in more than one contest.
Summarizing, semi-public contests can mitigate, yet not eliminate, a hold-
up problem faced by entrepreneurs as, ex post, contest winners do not suffer
from hold up but losers do. Non-exclusive private screening, where investors
share inside information on a certain project value, is unprofitable for investors
and, hence, does not exist in equilibrium. I show that a semi-public contest can
serve as a welfare enhancing “compromise” between investors and entrepreneurs
saving each side a positive expected payoff from matching.
As these contests only exist if they are efficient when compared to no screen-
ing and private screening, this model does not suggest that government authori-
ties intervene directly. However, there is an indirect role for public policy. First,
as semi-public contests depend on active competition among investors, it is cru-
cial that competition policy authorities safeguard competitive markets. Second,
as the semi-public contest mechanism has been used selectively in practice but
could potentially be used in many more fields, spreading information on how it
works could make “investors” in some markets, who are feeling now that they
only have the choice between private screening and no screening, consider using
the semi-public contest mechanism to match with “entrepreneurs”.
I endogenize the investors’ choice of mechanism and the entrepreneurs’
product development and contest participation decisions in a four-stage multi-
principal multi-agent game with incomplete information. First, entrepreneurs
decide whether to develop their ideas into projects and investors decide whether
to enter the market, or not. Second, investors choose sequentially among private
screening, no screening, and a semi-public contest. In a contest, they also choose
the number (not the identity) of winners. Third, each entrepreneur simultane-
ously chooses whether to participate in screening, if offered, and in which contest
to participate, if more than one is offered. Contest winners’ project values are
publicized but the sponsor of a contest exclusively learns losers’ values. Finally,
every investor places a bid for every project in a first-price sealed bid auction.
The final stage draws on the seminal article by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Mil-
3
grom, and Weber (1983) (henceforth: EMW), who analyze a first-price sealed
bid auction in a common-value setting when one bidder has more information on
the item auctioned and the other bidders have symmetrically less information.
The key insight from EMW used in this model is that it pays for an investor to
know more about the value of a project than competing investors.
The paper most related to this one is Rajan (1992), which also draws on
EMW to study entrepreneur financing. Rajan models the trade-off faced by
an entrepreneur to choose between different forms of credit financing. He ar-
gues that the apparently efficient form, borrowing from an informed (insider)
bank, comes at a cost: banks have bargaining power over the entrepreneurial
firm’s profits. This notion is related to the hold-up problem I identified above.
Rajan’s focus and model, however, are different. In his model there is only
one entrepreneur, not many; market entry of entrepreneurs and investors is not
endogenous; and the entrepreneur may exert effort that affects the distribution
of project returns.
Felli and Roberts (2002) also endogenize entrepreneurs’ efforts. In their
matching model, many sellers of a good meet many buyers. In various specifi-
cations of the game, either sellers or buyers or both groups can invest specifically
in their qualities, which influences their respective values when being matched.
Subsequently, buyers may simultaneously and independently submit bids to the
sellers. In contrast both to Rajan (1992) and to Felli and Roberts (2002), in my
model the value of an entrepreneur’s project is exogenously given, yet unknown
to all players, and the complementarity of inputs from every entrepreneur and
every investor is perfect. In turn, my model adds a new mechanism to the
literature that can mitigate a dilemma at the very beginning of the process of
innovation, where ideas may be developed endogenously up to a stage where
entrepreneurs can discuss them with investors.
This focus on the early idea development stage is shared with Biais and
Perotti (2008), who treat the problem of stealing innovative ideas. They start
from the notion that ideas may have several dimensions that can be discussed
by an entrepreneur with different experts and propose a mechanism that allows
the entrepreneur to avoid idea stealing.
Related to stage 3 of my paper, Azmat and Möller (2009) endogenize con-
testants’ participation decisions if multiple contests compete for participants.
They also endogenize the contestants’ effort decisions and the contest organiz-
ers’ prize structures. I abstract from both issues in this paper. This is also why
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this paper has only weak links to the literature on contests and tournaments.3
Instead, I endogenize participation of both market sides in the entire game, the
screening technology of investors, and their bidding behavior.
My paper is also related to the literature on research contests.4 In a research
contest, suppliers of an innovation bid for a procurement contract that is of-
fered by a monopsonistic buyer. In a semi-public contest, in contrast, first the
suppliers (entrepreneurs) endogenously develop innovations. Next they have to
be incentivized to participate in screening such that their project values are
revealed—despite knowing that the inside buyer will exploit them later when
bidding against less informed outside buyers. A semi-public contest can alle-
viate this problem because it serves as a buyer’s commitment device to only
exploit losers, not winners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the conditions that make existence of a semi-public contest part
of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; this section also shows the main results.
Section 4 describes two applications of the model, business plan competitions
and TV casting shows, in more detail. Section 5 concludes and specifies the
general requirements for economic situations in which the use of semi-public
contests may increase welfare. Appendix A presents several extensions and
robustness checks. All proofs are in Appendix B.
2 The Model
Entrepreneurs
On the seller side of a market there are N entrepreneurs, each of whom is
endowed with one project idea and acting as inventor. N is common knowledge
but, because the N entrepreneurs are drawn from a large population, their
identities are unknown. The cost of development for entrepreneur i is Di,
which is a realization of the random variable D̃i with support (0,∞). All draws
are i.i.d., hence, D̃i ≡ D̃. D̃ is common knowledge but i learns his realization
Di privately before he decides whether to develop his project, or not. If i
decides to spend Di, he obtains a project with the potential value Zi, which
also represents i’s talent and is a realization of the random variable Z̃i that
has support [0, Z̄], no atoms, and expectation E(Z̃). All draws are i.i.d., hence,
3See Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) and Konrad (2009) for overviews of this literature.
4See Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Fullerton et al. (2002), and Che and
Gale (2003).
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Z̃i ≡ Z̃. I will omit the subscript i whenever there is no danger of confusion. Z̃ is
statistically independent of D̃ and is common knowledge but nobody, including
entrepreneur i, knows the realization Zi. Consequently, every entrepreneur has
the same expectation about his own Zi. Every entrepreneur needs an investor
to produce the value Zi.
The independence of Z̃ and D̃ captures that the development cost of an
idea depends on several exogenous factors, such as the industry or the potential
production technology of the project. In contrast, the market value of an idea
depends on other factors, such as the degree of competitiveness and consumer
demand. Similarly, the assumption that i knows Di but not Zi reflects that
the development cost is determined on the supply side, which entrepreneurs
are assumed to know better than the market value, which is determined on the
demand side.5 Moreover, i does not know his potential competitors. Thus,
even if he gets feedback from his friends or colleagues that his idea is “good” or
“valuable”, he does not know how valuable it is compared to other ideas.
Investors
On the buyer side of the market there are m + 1 identical investors, who may
buy entrepreneurs’ projects. They can be considered project developers who
have both the necessary financial means and the knowledge to compare project
values and to transform a project into a marketable product. However, they
lack innovative ideas and, thus, need an entrepreneur’s project to realize its
value Z. To obtain an overview of the market and to learn which projects are
developed by entrepreneurs, every investor j has to spend an entry cost F ≥ 0
for market research. Without further investigation each investor just can guess
the true value of a randomly chosen project and, thus, expects E(Z̃).
Summarizing, at the beginning of the game an entrepreneur is endowed
with an idea that just has a potential value. Only if he spends the development
cost, he transforms his idea into a project that can be presented and sold to an
investor. The investor, after buying a project, has to develop it further into a
marketable product. This paper only offers a reduced form model of the product
development process (by normalizing the net present value for the investor to
Zi). Instead its focus is on the process until an investor buys a project from an
5For instance, in life sciences Di can be very high but the value Zi of the project might be
low because close substitutes exist and Bertrand competition among them is likely. Conversely,
the development cost of a new business method on the internet might be low but its value




Each investor can hire an independent jury (see details below), which can screen
an entrepreneur’s project for a unit cost k. When offered a screening, en-
trepreneur i can choose to collaborate, which costs him c. Both k and c are
specific to one screening instance. They reflect the time and the effort spent to
interact with each other and to produce documents, etc. that are targeted to
one specific screening. If a screening takes place, the jury learns the value of the
entrepreneur’s project, Zi,6 and informs the investor financing the screening,
but nobody else, about it. An investor with such superior information is an
insider. The remaining m investors are outsiders with respect to entrepreneur
i. The entrepreneur, however, cannot compare his project to others’ and, thus,
does not learn anything by getting screened.
Forms of Screening
Screening can take either of two forms: exclusive private screening or semi-
public contest. After a private screening the jury reports the value Zi of ev-
ery project screened only to the investor who pays its screening cost.7 Alter-
natively, if an investor j organizes a semi-public contest, he picks a number
nj ≤ N of winning slots. Then, the independent jury publicly declares the
nj entrepreneurs with the highest project values “winners” of the contest and
publicizes their project values.8
Outsourcing the picking of winners to a jury serves as a commitment device
of the contest sponsor that indeed the best entrepreneurs are declared winners.
If the sponsor picked or published the contest winners himself, similar to private
screening, he would have an incentive to misreport and to keep information on
the best entrepreneurs private. This incentive would be foreseen by the outsiders
and, hence, no reputation would be produced for the contest winners.
One interpretation of the completely truthful jury is that the jurors have a
6The assumption of perfect value revelation is a shortcut. See Appendix A for a discussion
of noisy screening by the jury. I could also assume that each entrepreneur must choose an
effort level if he gets screened and assume that the cost of effort decreases in the Zi of an
entrepreneur. This could produce a sorting effort equilibrium and enable the jury to observe
Zi indirectly. Instead, as a short cut I assume that c is fixed and the jury observes Zi directly.
7See Appendix A for a discussion of private screening by more than one investor.
8See Appendix A for a discussion of the assumption that winners’ precise values are pub-
licized.
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high reputation themselves, which translates into high expected future payoffs.
If they falsely declare winners, there is a probability of being detected and losing
this reputation.9
Publishing the identity of winners of a contest by the jury has two effects.
First, all outside investors can update their beliefs about the value of winners’
and losers’ projects. Second, each winner gains a reputation for being smart or
talented, which is worth R(αj) to him, where αj ≡ njNj ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
of winning the contest sponsored by investor j, nj is the number of winning
slots, and Nj is the total number of participants in contest j. I make the
following key assumption.
Assumption 1 (Reputation production function) R(αj) ∈ [0, R̄] is the
reputation production function of a semi-public contest, where:







Assumption 1 implies that winning a contest is only valuable if not every
participant “wins” and that the value of winning a contest increases in a con-
vex way the less likely it is to win. R can be interpreted as the net present
value of future earnings attributable to winning the contest, apart from getting
higher bids when selling a project.10 Alternatively, R can be interpreted as the
non-pecuniary utility from the esteem attached to winning a contest, which is
enjoyed in other social situations. In both interpretations, the more exclusive
it is to be a winner of a competitive contest the higher winning is valued. Note
that private screening does not create a reputation because its results are not
publicized and matching of an entrepreneur and a private screener cannot be
taken as a positive signal from an outsider’s perspective because all project
values are nonnegative.
The publication of winners’ identities creates a public signal on their values.
Analogous to private screening, I assume the jury informs the contest sponsor
9It is straightforward to model such a subgame as a repeated game and to show that jurors
who value future payoffs sufficiently highly will not declare winners falsely in equilibrium. To
simplify the analysis I just assume truthful reporting.
10This interpretation is intuitive if we assume that, in a repeated game context, it is pro-
hibitively costly for an investor to check the history of past contest participation of each
entrepreneur. In contrast, winners can prove that they have actually won a contest by pro-
ducing appropriate documents, etc. Hence, contest losers and new entrepreneurs will be pooled
in the future. Then we can normalize the reputation of each member of this pool to be zero.
As project values depend on entrepreneurs’ talents, investors will believe that the probability
that a former winner has a high project value is larger than the probability that another
entrepreneur has a high value. This belief creates R ≥ 0.
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about the precise realization Zi of every entrepreneur participating in the con-
test in private. Hence, the insider has an information advantage over outsiders
with respect to the losers of the contest.
Besides private screening and semi-public contest, the third option of an
investor is no screening. After screening or not screening, the project of one
entrepreneur at a time is auctioned among all investors in a first-price, sealed-
bid auction.
Investors and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral. Investors face
no budget constraints and have infinite demand for investment projects with
nonnegative expected payoff net of cost. I assume that, before placing their
auction bids, all investors learn whether an entrepreneur was screened, or not.
Timing of the Game
First, entrepreneurs decide whether to develop a project (for the cost Di), or
not. Investors decide whether to become active (for the cost F ) or not to
participate in the market. Second, investors are ordered randomly by nature.
The first investor chooses among exclusive private screening, semi-public con-
test, and no screening. The other investors follow in the order of the random
draw. The sponsor of a contest determines nj , which is made public. Third,
if private screening or a contest is chosen by an investor, each entrepreneur
simultaneously decides whether and where to participate in screening. Juries
screen participating entrepreneurs and inform their sponsors. Fourth, each in-
vestor places a bid b for each project being auctioned. The highest positive bid
wins and determines the price for which the entrepreneur sells the project to
the highest bidder.11 Figure 1 displays the timing of the endogenous decisions
in the game.
The solution concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. As usual in
such games, there are multiple equilibria, each sustained by its own beliefs.
Due to the ex ante symmetry of entrepreneurs, on the one side, and investors,
on the other, I focus on symmetric equilibria. I proceed by first analyzing
the benchmark case of no screening. Then, I introduce the option of exclusive
private screening. Finally, I allow every investor to set up a semi-public contest
and show the conditions under which the existence of a contest and active
participation of entrepreneurs therein characterize an equilibrium.
11The assumption of a complete sale of the project is made for simplicity. As long as Zi is
































Figure 1: Time structure of the model
3 Analysis
The Benchmark: No Screening
If no screening of an entrepreneur takes place, at stage 4 all investors have
symmetric information and they know that they have symmetric information.
Let b denote the bid and E(πj) denote the expected auction payoff of an investor.
Lemma 1 (No screening) In equilibrium, each investor bids b = E(Z̃) and
realizes E(π) = 0.
If in a common-value auction with symmetric bidders one bidder bids more
than the others, he will bid more than the average value of projects auctioned
and thereby reduce his expected payoff. This characteristic is known as the
winner’s curse.12 Note that the bidding strategies in Lemma 1 do not depend
on costs incurred by the investors in earlier stages, namely F , as these costs
are sunk at stage 4. The situation of bidders is related to the one of sellers in
Bertrand competition with homogenous goods.
Exclusive Private Screening
If exactly one investor has screened entrepreneur i, he is an insider with respect
to i, by definition. Thus, at stage 4, I am looking for a Bayesian equilibrium in
a first-price sealed-bid auction, where one bidder has precise information about
the value of the project auctioned, whereas m bidders symmetrically have less
information.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) analyze such an auction.
Let β(Z̃) denote a pure strategy of the insider, in which he maps every value
12See, for instance, Milgrom and Weber (1982).
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Z that he learns via screening onto a bid b.13 For each outsider j, a mixed
strategy is a distribution Gj on R+ where Gj(b) is the probability that his bid
does not exceed the insider’s bid b. Let G(b) = G1(b) · ... · Gm(b). Then, G(b)
denotes the distribution of the maximum of the bids made by the outsiders.
Definition 1 (Expected payoffs from one auction) Define E(πOUT ) as the
expected payoff of an outsider, E(πINS) as the expected payoff of the insider,
and E(πi) as the expected payoff of the entrepreneur selling his project. Define
the expectation of the insider’s share in the total expected payoff as (1− θ) and
the entrepreneur’s share as θ.
Lemma 2 (Auction equilibrium with asymmetric information) (i): The
(m+ 1)-tuple (β,G1, ..., Gm) is an equilibrium point if and only if:
β(Z̃) = E[Z̃|Z̃ < Z] and (2)
G(b) = Prob(β(Z̃) ≤ b). (3)
(ii): At equilibrium, each outsider expects E(πOUT ) = 0, the insider expects
E(πINS) = (1− θ(Z̃))E(Z̃), entrepreneur i expects E(πi) = θ(Z̃)E(Z̃).
Comparing equilibrium strategies in Lemmas 1 and 2.(i), in an auction that
was preceded by screening, the outsiders are more cautious than in the sym-
metric information case if they believe that an insider has additional useful
information. They bid according to a mixed strategy over [0, E(Z̃)] and, thus,
avoid the winner’s curse in expectation.
According to EMW, Theorem 4, the distribution of the total payoff E(Z̃)
between the seller and the inside bidder only depends on the realization Z
that the insider learns before bidding. Given that Z̃ is known, θ = θ(Z̃) is
unambiguous, which is common knowledge. For the sake of brevity I will omit
Z̃ in the notation of θ below.
The key insight from Lemma 2.(ii) for this model is that it pays for an
investor to be an insider as he makes a positive expected payoff, unlike the
symmetric information case of Lemma 1. Unavoidably, this comes at a cost for
the entrepreneur selling his project because the project value is not influenced
by screening but the insider can appropriate a share of it if he screens. However,
if the entrepreneur does not agree to screening, this refusal cannot rationally
be used as a signal for low ability from the investors’ perspective because en-
trepreneurs do not know their own relative ability. Therefore, investors have to
13According to EMW, p.164, if Z̃ had an atom at some Z, β(Z̃) would have to be a mixed
strategy.
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incentivize entrepreneurs to participate in screening. I will explore next how to
achieve this.
Semi-Public Contests
Consider the following candidate equilibrium: At stage 1, all entrepreneurs
whose project development does not cost more than D̄ develop their projects.
All investors spend the entry cost F as long as it is not larger than a threshold
level, F̄ . At stage 2, the first of the m+1 investors, who was randomly selected,
chooses to sponsor a semi-public contest and determines a number of winning
slots n∗ for the best participants. The remaining m investors do not offer a
contest. At stage 3, all N entrepreneurs participate in the contest and get
screened by the jury. All investors observe the contest winners’ types, while
the insider retains an information advantage with respect to the losers’ types.
At stage 4, the auction takes place, in which all investors bid the value Z for
each winner of the contest. For each loser, however, bids of the insider and the
outsiders differ (in an adjusted version of Lemma 2).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to prove that such a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium exists. As noted before, this equilibrium is not unique
but it is efficient when compared to private screening and no screening, as we
will see below. I do not regard a market breakdown equilibrium in more detail,
in which no entrepreneur develops a project, no investor enters the market and,
hence, innovation does not take place.
Definition 2 (Average values of contest winners and losers) Consider con-
test j. I define Zn as the expected lowest value of a winner’s project, Zw as the
expected average value of a winner’s project, and Zl as the expected average
value of a loser’s project.
By assumption, the identities of the best nj entrepreneurs are publicized
as winners together with their project values. Every investor also knows the
distribution Z̃. Hence, he can guess Zn, Zw and Zl. It follows that Zl < E(Z̃) <
Zw and that 0 < Zl < Zn < Zw < Z̄ for αj ∈ (0, 1).
What is the bidding equilibrium for an entrepreneur’s project at stage 4 if
he is a contest winner? In this case, all investors symmetrically have precise
information on the value of his project: Z. By the Bertrand competition logic
applied in Lemma 1, each investor bids Z and earns an expected payoff of zero.
At stage 3, when the entrepreneur has to decide about contest participation, he
does not know the exact value of his project. However, he knows the number of
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winning slots nj and can form a belief about the number of contest participants
Nj (see details below). Hence, he can form a belief about αj and use it, together
with his knowledge on Z̃, to guess the average value of a winning project, Zw.
What is the bidding equilibrium if an entrepreneur is a contest loser and
there is only one insider knowing his type? This case is similar to the one
analyzed in Lemma 2, with the exception that the support of the project value
distribution is [0, Zn], which changes the support of bidding strategies in Lemma
2.(i). It changes Lemma 2.(ii) to E(πINS) = (1 − θ)Zl and E(πi) = θZl,
respectively. All this is common knowledge.
At stage 3, every entrepreneur has to make two decisions: (i) whether he
wants to participate in a contest at all or whether he prefers private screening
or no screening; (ii) conditional on contest participation, where he wants to
participate if there are multiple contests offered.
Definition 3 (Entrepreneurs’ beliefs) From the perspective of entrepreneur
i, N̂j is the expected number of participants in contest j before i decides about
his participation, and α̂j ≡ njN̂j+1 is the expected winning probability in contest
j after i decided to participate in j.
At stage 3, the development cost Di is sunk. If he participates in contest j,
entrepreneur i expects a payoff E(πi) of:
α̂j [R+ Zw] + (1− α̂j)[θZl]− c. (4)
By using E(Z̃) = α̂jZw + (1− α̂j)Zl, this can be rewritten as:
E(Z̃) + α̂jR(α̂j)− (1− α̂j)(1− θ)Zl(α̂j)− c. (5)
An entrepreneur can influence his expected payoff by choosing to participate
in a certain contest j, which increases the expected number of participants in
that contest by one and, thus, has an influence on the winning probability in j.
Note that α̂j influences E(πi) via three arguments: it has a direct effect
(via α̂j) and two indirect effects (via R(α̂j) and Zl(α̂j)). Due to the decreasing
effect of α̂j on R, E(πi) is non-monotonic in α̂j .
Lemma 3 (Optimal winning probability) From entrepreneur i’s perspec-
tive, there is a unique, well-defined winning probability α∗ that maximizes his
expected payoff.
Lemma 3 implies that entrepreneurs face a trade-off when deciding in which
contest to participate. If the winning probability in a contest is high, it comes at
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a cost because the reputation benefit of being a winner in that contest is small.
In contrast, competition for the high reputation benefit that can be gained
in a very exclusive contest is intense. However, there the winning probability
is small, by definition, which reduces the expected utility from participation.
Therefore, the expected payoff function of entrepreneurs from contest partici-
pation is hump-shaped in the expected winning probability; see Figure 2. This
implies that, for α̂j > α∗, there are positive network externalities, i.e. the ex-
pected utility of the participants in contest j increases if another entrepreneur
participates in this contest. For α̂j ≤ α∗, there are negative network externali-
ties because every additional participant drives α̂j further away from α∗.
To facilitate the comparison of mechanisms I define the winning probability
levels, for which entrepreneurs expect the same payoff as from no screening:
Definition 4 (Threshold winning probabilities) Define:
α ≡ c+ (1− θ)Zl(α)
R(α) + (1− θ)Zl(α)
≤ c+ (1− θ)Zl(ᾱ)
R(ᾱ) + (1− θ)Zl(ᾱ)
≡ ᾱ. (6)
Lemma 4 (Entrepreneurs’ preferred mechanism) Assume E(πi(α∗)) ≥
E(Z̃) and α̂j > 0. (i): From an entrepreneur’s view, private screening is
dominated by no screening and by a semi-public contest. (ii): If α̂j ∈ [α, ᾱ],
an entrepreneur prefers a semi-public contest over no screening, and vice versa
otherwise.
The intuition of Lemma 4.(i) is that entrepreneurs have no interest in pro-
viding information about their types to a single investor as this is not only costly
but, due to lower bids, also decreases their expected auction revenues. The in-
tuition of Lemma 4.(ii) is that a semi-public contest can be entrepreneurs’ most
preferred mechanism if the expected winning probability of a contest lies in an
intermediate range and thereby the expected reputation benefit from winning,
α̂jR(α̂j), is high. This result is mainly due to the inverted effect from α on
R(α). Furthermore, the value of R(α) must be sufficiently large at its max-
imum α∗ in order to make contest participation attractive for entrepreneurs.
Only then it is possible that in expectation the reputation benefit conditional
on becoming a contest winner outweighs the screening cost of an entrepreneur
plus the share of the project value that the insider can appropriate conditional
on the entrepreneur becomes a contest loser. For the remainder of the analysis
I assume that this holds:
Assumption 2 (Expected contest payoff) E(πi(α∗)) ≥ E(Z̃).
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Figure 2 summarizes Lemmas 3 and 4 by plotting an entrepreneur’s expected
payoff from contest participation, Eπi(SPC), and from no screening, Eπi(NS),

























































Figure 2: Expected payoffs from contest participation and no screening.
Lemma 4 captures entrepreneurs’ participation constraint in semi-public
contests as a whole. As a next step, I characterize the equilibrium specifying the
one contest in which an entrepreneur participates, given that the participation
constraint holds and there are possibly multiple contests offered.
Lemma 5 (Contest participation equilibrium) Let Q be the number of
contests that offer at least one winning slot, that is for which nj ≥ 1. (i):
If njN ∈ [α, ᾱ], there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies that dominates no screening. (ii): Given that α̂j(φ∗j ) ∈ [α, ᾱ], there exists
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, Φ(φ∗j ), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q},∀i,
that dominates no screening. Every entrepreneur participates in every contest
with probability φ∗j , where:
φ∗j =







If njN /∈ [α, ᾱ] but α̂j(φ
∗
j ) ∈ [α, ᾱ] (or vice versa), Φ(φ∗j ) is the unique symmetric
equilibrium (and vice versa).
When every entrepreneur has to decide about contest participation, all en-
trepreneurs have the same information on the number of winning slots in each
contest {n1, ..., nQ} and have identical characteristics in expectation. However,
they cannot coordinate their participation choices and have no rational basis
for asymmetric beliefs on the other entrepreneurs’ choices. This explains the
use of symmetric Nash equilibrium in this model.
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In a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, all entrepreneurs, by defini-
tion, participate in the same contest j. Thus, the expected winning probability
in this contest is α̂j =
nj
N . Lemma 5.(i) states that this winning probability,
depending on the reputation associated with it and the screening cost incurred
by the entrepreneurs, can lead to higher expected utility for entrepreneurs than
the outside option, no screening, which secures them an expected payoff E(Z̃)
from auctioning off their projects.
Lemma 5.(ii) starts from the fact that the expected winning probability
of an entrepreneur in contest j is higher than in the symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium if the other entrepreneurs participate in j with less than probability
one because they participate in other contests with some positive probability.
Then it is possible that entrepreneurs expect a higher utility than under no
screening (and than in the pure strategy equilibrium). To make this situation
an equilibrium the strategies of the other entrepreneurs make every entrepreneur
i indifferent between playing any mixed strategy because they make sure that
i faces the same ex post winning probability in every contest, that is given he
participates in it. Given this strategy combination, Φ(φ∗j ), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q}, ∀i,





∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. (8)
The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique if the winning probability from
the pure strategy equilibrium, njN , is too low and, thus, is dominated by no
screening. The pure strategy equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium
coincide if only one contest is organized by investors (Q = 1).
Now consider the second stage of the game, in which nature determines
an order of investors, {1, ...,m+ 1}, and investors decide sequentially, starting
with investor 1, among no screening, private screening, and semi-public contest.
Abstracting from sunk market entry cost F , investor j expects a payoff of zero
from no screening; see Lemma 1. From private screening he expects [(1 −
θ)E(Z̃)− k] from each entrepreneur screened; see Lemma 2. If α̂j(φ∗j ) ∈ [α, ᾱ],
all entrepreneurs will participate in a contest. Then, he expects [−k] from each
winner and [(1− θ)Zl − k] from each loser. In total, he expects:
(φ∗jN − nj)(1− θ)Zl − φ∗jNk, (9)
where φ∗jN is the expected number of entrepreneurs participating in his contest.
It is straightforward to observe from (9) that an investor will never organize
14See the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix B for a numerical illustration of the equilibrium
strategies’ mechanics.
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a semi-public contest if the screening cost k is prohibitive. As the minimum
number of winning slots in case a contest is offered is nj = 1, I will only consider
cases for the remainder of the analysis, for which the following assumption holds:
Assumption 3 (Investor’s screening cost) k ≤ N−1N (1− θ)Zl ≡ k̄.
Lemma 6 (Competing contests and investor payoff) Conditional on of-





Lemma 6 implies that, if investor 1 offers a semi-public contest, his expected
payoff decreases in the number of competing contests. This is due to two effects.
First, because of the mixed strategy of entrepreneurs when deciding about con-
test participation (see Lemma 5.(ii)), investor 1 expects less participants in his
contest for each additional contest that is offered. This also decreases the num-
ber of losers in his contest, who are the source of his positive expected payoff
in the final auction. It also implies an increased winning probability α̂j for en-
trepreneurs, which reduces the average value of losers’ projects, Zl. Therefore,
an investor is hurt twice for each additional contest that is offered.
Consequently, Lemma 6 implies that, given investor 1 offers a contest, he
has an incentive to foreclose entry of other investors into the market of contests
and to create a monopoly. More precisely, investor 1 has an incentive to deter
investor 2 from entry. If this is successful, every investor deciding about offering
a contest after investor 2 faces the same problem as investor 2 and will, thus,
not enter the contest market.
How can investor 1 avoid that investor 2 offers a contest? Given the sequen-
tial set-up of stage 2 of the game, investor 1 can be regarded as the Stackelberg
leader and investor 2 the Stackelberg follower. Investor 1 can exploit a first-
mover advantage and set n1 such that investor 2’s payoff from playing his best
response is negative if and only if n1 ∈ (n1, n̄1).15 This captures two competi-
tive constraints of investor 1 when maximizing his own expected payoff (a lower
constraint n1 and an upper constraint n̄1) and determines the boundaries of
kind of a “limit pricing” strategy. In addition, he has to make sure that the two
demand constraints defined in Lemma 5 hold for Q = 1:
n1
N
∈ [α, ᾱ]. (11)
15See the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix for details, including a specification of
n1, n̄1.
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Definition 5 (Threshold parameter values) Define n, n̄ as investor 1’s bind-
ing constraints, k̄ as a cost level that is relevant if the lower demand constraint
is binding, k̂ as the effective upper screening cost level of investors, ĉ as the
entrepreneurial cost level below which participation in more than one contest is
profitable, and c̄j as the prohibitive cost level of entrepreneurs in contest j:
n ≡ max{n1, αN}, n̄ ≡ min{n̄1, ᾱN}, (12)
k̄ ≡ (R(α)− c)(1− θ)Zl
R(α) + (1− θ)Zl
, k̂ ≡ min{k̄, k̄} (13)
ĉ ≡ α̂2R2 + (1− α̂1)(1− θ)Zl, (14)
c̄j ≡ α̂jRj − (1− α̂j)(1− θ)Zl. (15)
Note that, if and only if n ≤ n̄, then the intervals (n1, n̄1) and [αN, ᾱN ]
overlap. Only then it is possible for investor 1 to satisfy both demand con-
straints and competitive constraints.
Proposition 1 (Semi-public contest equilibrium) If either (i): c ≤ ĉ or
if (ii): n ≤ n̄ and k ≤ k̂, then there is a unique equilibrium at stage 2 of the
game, in which investor 1 organizes a semi-public contest with n1 = n ≡ n∗
winning slots. All other investors do not organize a contest.
The proposition’s intuition starts from the notion that some supported pa-
rameter realizations allow investor 1 to foreclose the market of semi-public
contests to subsequent investors while still attracting participation of all en-
trepreneurs and making a positive expected payoff. This is a sign of a natural
monopoly.
If, as in Proposition 1.(i), the screening cost of entrepreneurs is low (c ≤ ĉ),
more than one contest could be organized but entrepreneurs would have an
incentive to participate in two contests. This would let the two insiders compete
with symmetric information in the auction at stage 4, thereby increasing the
expected bid and increasing the aggregate probability of the entrepreneur of
being a contest winner. In turn, this behavior would make the net payoff from
organizing the contest negative for both insiders. Knowing this, the second
and all subsequent investors do not organize a contest. Hence, together with
Assumption 3, c ≤ ĉ is a sufficient condition for existence of a unique contest
in equilibrium.
Alternatively, if c̄1 ≥ c > ĉ, investor 1 can still profitably foreclose entry
into the contest market by investor 2 if both demand constraints and both
competitive constraints hold, that is if n ≤ n̄; see Proposition 1.(ii). In this
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case he prefers to set n1 equal to the lowest level of the interval [n, n̄]. As
n is defined as the maximum of the lower demand constraint and the lower
competitive constraint, I need to distinguish between two cases.
If the lower demand constraint (αN) is binding, investor 1 can foreclose
the contest market in more cases if the reputation gained by winners R(α) is
increasing or if the entrepreneur’s cost from getting screened (c) is decreasing.
Both of these conditions let k̂ increase and αN decrease. In this case a low
screening cost and a high reputation benefit for winners are substitutes, despite
k’s direct impact on investors and R’s direct impact on entrepreneurs. The
transmission channel is the number of winners in the contest, n∗. If R grows,
investor 1 reduces n∗ but, despite the reduced probability of becoming a winner,
entrepreneurs still participate in the contest because they value the increased
R in case of winning. In contrast, the investor benefits from a reduction in
n∗ as he only declares winners openly to attract participation of entrepreneurs,
not because he benefits from it directly. His payoff comes from contest losers.
Consequently, if R grows, he can afford to set up a contest for higher screening
cost. However, if investor 1 reduces n∗ too much, he risks hurting the lower
competitive constraint. Then it becomes profitable for investor 2 to set up a
contest, too.
In general, comprising the cases where either the lower demand constraint
or the lower competitive constraint are binding, a monopolistic semi-public
contest is more likely if the screening cost of investors (k) is low or if the share
of the expected average value of a contest loser’s project that investor 1 can
appropriate ((1− θ)Zl) is high.
A main contribution of this paper is to show existence of a unique semi-
public contest in equilibrium. Therefore, complementary to Proposition 1, I
will only outline the conditions that lead to the existence of more than one
contest in a less formal and more concise manner below.
If c̄ ≥ c > ĉ, every entrepreneur would not participate in more than one
contest voluntarily, even if it were organized. Hence, more than one contest
can exist in equilibrium. In such a situation, if n > n̄, investor 1 cannot
attract participation of entrepreneurs in his own contest and avoid that a second
investor sets up a semi-public contest profitably at the same time. Going one
step further, it depends on the parameter realizations of the reputation function
R, the screening costs k and c, and the expected average value of a contest loser’s
project that an inside investor can appropriate, (1 − θ)Zl, whether investors 1
and 2 can profitably prevent entry of a third, etc. investor. Every investor who
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offers a contest in equilibrium makes nonnegative payoff, while entrepreneurs
make an extra expected payoff, on top of their no screening outside option
E(Z̃), only if the demand constraint is not binding (αN < n1).
Proposition 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Private screening and exclusivity of insider) Given n ≤ n̄
and the lower demand constraint is binding (αN = n) but k > k̂, no contest will
be offered. For k̂ < k ≤ k̄, investor 1 may offer private screening at stage 2.
The other investors do neither offer a contest nor private screening. Whenever
a semi-public contest is established in equilibrium, it has one exclusive sponsor.
A private screener’s net expected payoff is (1−θ)E(Z̃)−k per entrepreneur
screened, as long as he is the only insider with respect to a certain entrepreneur.
If investor 1 offers private screening because k is too high to offer a contest, all
subsequent investors can only change their status from outsider to non-exclusive
insider by also offering private screening. However, a second inside investor
faces perfect competition with the first insider in the auction at stage 4 and,
hence, expects a net payoff of −k, see Lemma 1. It follows that screening of a
certain entrepreneur can only be profitable if it takes place exclusively. This also
explains why sponsoring of a given contest is always exclusive in equilibrium.
Now it is straightforward to find the equilibrium of stage 1 of the game,
where every entrepreneur has to decide whether he wants to develop a project
for an individually drawn cost Di and where every investor has to decide about
spending the market entry fee F .
Proposition 2 (Market entry equilibrium) Assume that Q contests exist






N+Q−1 . Entrepreneur i develops his idea into a project if and only if Di ≤ D̄
and investor j enters the market if and only if F ≤ F̄ , where:




(φ∗qN − n∗q)(1− θ)Zl − φ∗qNk
m+ 2− q
> 0. (17)
Proposition 2 states that at stage 1 of the game all entrepreneurs develop
their ideas into projects whose development costs are not larger than the ex-
pected payoff from selling the project. Similarly, it states that investors will
only enter the market as long as the market entry cost is not larger than the
expected payoff from entering. Proposition 2 also implies the following corollary.
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Corollary 2 (Competition and hold-up) Competition among investors (m >
0) is necessary to establish a semi-public contest in equilibrium. The contest al-
leviates a hold-up problem faced by entrepreneurs in private screening.
If there is no competition among investors (m = 0), the monopsonistic
investor has no incentive to finance any form of screening. He bids b = ε in
the auction for every project and expects a high monopoly payoff, given that
entrepreneurs develop projects. In turn, this reduces entrepreneurs’ expected
gross payoff from developing an idea to ε and, hence, deters all entrepreneurs
from doing so. Note that any announcement of the monopsonist to organize a
contest or to bid more than ε is not subgame-perfect but cheap talk.
Abstracting from semi-public contests and just comparing private screening
and no screening reveals that, in private screening, entrepreneurs suffer from
a hold-up problem: first, they are required to spend a relationship-specific in-
vestment (c) and, then, are left with less payoff than without screening because
E(Z̃) has to be shared with the monopsonist. Lemma 4.(i) shows that this hold-
up problem lets the private screening market break down. Proposition 1 shows
that, given an investor organizes a contest, entrepreneurs can benefit from it and
participate. In this situation, they voluntarily spend the relationship-specific
cost as they uniquely provide the sponsor with inside information conditional
on becoming a contest loser. The entrepreneurs are motivated to do so because
of the very characteristic of a semi-public contest, that with a certain probabil-
ity (α̂j) they are among the winners of a contest and receive a high payoff from
information revelation. Hence, the existence of a semi-public contest alleviates
the entrepreneurs’ hold-up problem faced in private screening.
Corollary 3 (Positive expected payoffs) If, according to Proposition 1, a
semi-public contests exists in equilibrium and the lower demand constraint is
binding (n = αN), the contest sponsor expects higher payoffs than under no
screening. If the lower demand constraint is not binding (n > αN), entrepreneurs
also expect higher payoffs than under no screening.
This corollary follows from the inequalities in (16) and (17), which compare
expected payoffs in the contest case and the no screening case, abstracting from
entry cost F and development cost Di. This result is important because no
screening dominates private screening for entrepreneurs, according to Lemma
4.(i). Thus, without considering semi-public contests as a mechanism, any per-
fect equilibrium would entail no screening, given that investors’ market entry
cost F = 0. Every investor would expect a zero payoff while every entrepreneur
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would expect E(Z̃)−Di and develop his idea up to a cost of E(Z̃). For F > 0,
the unique perfect equilibrium would be a complete market breakdown: en-
trepreneurs do not develop ideas, investors do not enter the market. Every
player gets zero payoff. To prepare the final proposition I make the following
definition.
Definition 6 (Welfare and relative efficiency) Welfare comprises the ag-
gregate expected net payoffs of all entrepreneurs and all investors, given a cer-
tain mechanism. The one mechanism creating higher welfare than the other two
mechanisms is relatively efficient.
Proposition 3 (Relative efficiency) If, according to Proposition 1, a semi-
public contest exists in equilibrium, the contest mechanism is relatively efficient.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that, at stage 2 of the game, investor 1
organizes a contest only if he is sure that entrepreneurs participate in it and
that he makes a positive payoff. Going back to stage 1 of the game, every
investor calculates the expected payoff from market entry, thereby considering
the probability that he will be the investor who organizes a contest profitably.
Corollary 3 implies that the inclusion of the contest mechanism in investors’
action sets at stage 1, on top of private screening and no screening, increases
the expected payoffs of investors of the entire game.
Entrepreneurs benefit from investors’ consideration of semi-public contests
as a mechanism because it increases their expected payoff from owning a de-
veloped project over the alternative cases. Hence, they are willing to develop
projects whose development cost exceeds their expected gross payoff from no
screening, E(Z̃), up to D̄ ≥ E(Z̃). This means that in a world with contests
more projects are developed than in a world without contests. Many of them
(for which Di < D̄) are welfare enhancing.
4 Applications
How “realistic” is the theory of semi-public contests presented above? In the
following section I will outline two applications that fit the model well. There-
after, in the concluding section I will condense the key characteristics of these
applications into a set of general requirements for economic situations, in which
the use of semi-public contests may increase welfare.
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Business Plan Competitions
A business plan is a document in which an entrepreneur lays out all aspects
of a business idea that are relevant for potential investors. A business plan
competition is an organized contest to which entrepreneurs send their business
plans. Experts evaluate the business ideas sent in, sometimes in several rounds,
and choose the set of winners who are typically awarded prizes in a public cer-
emony, followed by a lot of media attention. Many business plan competitions
are organized by business schools. Below I will describe the key features of the
“Moot Corp Competition” (MCC), which was set up in 1984 and is, according
to its website,16 “[...] the first competition of its kind for MBA students and is
still considered the most prestigious in the world. The Moot Corp Competition
has been crowned ‘the Super Bowl of world business plan competition.’ ”
MCC describes the typical entrepreneurs, jury members, and procedure of
the contest as “[...] a competition in which MBAs working in teams would con-
ceive an idea for a new business, develop the idea in a written business plan, and
present the plan to a panel of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, accountants
and lawyers.” This indicates that judges are experts who may have the ability
to correctly evaluate the projects described in business plans and oral presenta-
tions. A high reputation of winners is secured by the following rule: “All public
sessions of the competition, including but not limited to oral presentations and
question/answer sessions, are open to the public at large. Any and all of these
public sessions may be broadcast to interested persons through media which
may include radio, television and the Internet.” Notice that this implies that
all entrepreneurs appearing in public sessions of the competition, that is the
finalists, are winners in the sense of this model. Every non-sponsoring investor
can learn their types too but only the jury learns the types of entrepreneurs
who did not make it to the final round.
In the opening rounds each jury consists of about five judges, each with a
slightly different professional background.17 Due to the broad nature of the
MCC, investors may have differentiated investment interests with respect to
the industry or the investment stage of entrepreneurial projects. Thus, the
diversification of judges in a given jury, as reported on the website, ensures
exclusivity of every judge with a unique background.18 Because of the following
16This quote and the following ones were taken from http://www.mootcorp.org/index.asp
on April 17th, 2008.
17On http://www.mootcorp.org/GMCJudges07.htm, the names and employers of every judge
in the 2007 competition are mentioned.
18See also the discussion of multidimensional types in Appendix A.
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rule, a judge may use his inside knowledge himself if he is an investor or he
may convey it (potentially exclusively) to another investor: “[...] we will not
ask judges, reviewers, staff or the audience to agree to or sign non-disclosure
statements for any participant.”
Finally, the following quotes serve as evidence for the matching objective
between entrepreneurs (also as potential employees) and investors/sponsors:
“Participation in the Moot Corp Competition offers MBAs the following op-
portunities: [...] To make contact with venture capitalists and other investors.”
“Why Should You Participate [as a sponsor]? - The opportunity to meet and
employ the best entrepreneurial MBAs in the world. The opportunity to learn
about, invest in and partner with new ventures emerging from the best business
schools in the world. [italics added]”
TV Casting Shows
In TV casting shows, the “project value” of an entrepreneur is the net present
value that can be generated by the singing/dancing talent of would-be pop
stars. Singers have to prepare themselves specifically for a certain show. It is
important to understand that the crucial contest (in the sense of this model)
in such a show takes place in private before a subset of applicants appear on
TV screen. While the talents of those singers who “compete” publicly become
common knowledge among all investors, usually record labels, only the jury,
which may inform the sponsor, learns about the talent of singers who did not
make it to the public final round. As the number of singers appearing on TV
screen is fixed but the number of applicants is not, there may be applicants
with relatively high talent among the losers. If the sponsor offers one of them
a record contract, competition is less intense because other investors have less
information on that singer.19
To exemplify the appropriateness of the model to this application, I will
outline some key features of “American Idol” below, which is, according to its
19Moreover, there may be legal restrictions for contest participants to be matched
with a non-sponsoring investor: According to http://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/
archives/american_idol_5/2006_Feb_16_top_24, the contract signed by American Idol con-
testants “bans them from signing ‘. . . any talent management agreement, talent agency agree-
ment, recording contract, songwriting contract, acting contract, modeling contract, sponsor-
ship contract, or any merchandising contract . . . until three months following the date of
the first broadcast of the final episode announcing the winner of the competition.´ They can,
however, ask for ‘prior written consent.´” This indicates that non-sponsoring investors are
not excluded from bidding for entrepreneurs but that they are put at a disadvantage, by
construction of the mechanism.
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website, “Television’s No. 1 show” in the U.S. and has developed several fran-
chises in other countries.20 Taking this statement together with the following
one indicates a high level of public awareness of the contest and a high prize
both in money and in reputation of winners: “The judges have their say after
every performance, but it’s the viewing public that determines who will advance
to the next round of the competition and who will go home. [...] Eventually
the competition is narrowed down to two finalists who compete for a major
recording contract and the American Idol title. Past winners [...] already have
risen to the top of the recording industry.”
The following statement indicates that information on losers’ talents remains
unpublicized; only the jury learns it: “The show’s judges [...] winnow down the
competitors to a select group of semifinalists who sing their hearts out each week
for the studio audience and the television viewers.”21 To motivate the sponsor’s
participation, the judges can forward it exclusively to the sponsor, who pays
their salaries.
The following quote from Wikipedia indicates that American Idol is spon-
sored by exactly one record company, J Records (a subsidiary of industry giant
Sony/BMG), just as predicted by Corollary 1:22 “In an interview [...] on the
CBS TV current affairs show 60 Minutes on March 17, 2007 [...] judge Si-
mon Cowell openly declared that the underlying primary purpose of the Idol
franchise (including American Idol) was for 19 Entertainment (the parent cor-
poration that produces the Idol TV shows) to discover new singing talent that
can be signed to recording agreements that the corporation maintains with a
major record company (Sony/BMG), and benefit from the record sales of con-
testants and winners who are exposed to the worldwide marketplace through
the TV shows.”
I have not modeled a profit objective of the jury explicitly, but it is straight-
forward to adjust the model in a way, such that the sponsor’s cost of setting
up a given contest j is not Njk but a share of his gross payoff being paid to
the jury. This does not change the quality of the results. It is important in
this application, though, that the contest organizer, 19 Entertainment, has an
incentive to produce a credible signal on winners’ talents as this ensures the
high reputation of winners and, hence, the incentive for singers to participate
20This quote and the subsequent ones, unless otherwise stated, were taken on April 18th,
2008, from http://www.americanidol.com/about/.
21Note that “tens of thousands” of applicants compete for 36 semifinal slots, as of season 8
taking place in 2009. Hence, the number of contest losers is very high.
22See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Idol.
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and, hence, the incentive for the sponsor to pay for the contest.
Finally, recall that the model predicts (i) that contest winners are attractive
for all investors, including non-sponsoring investors, and (ii) that the sponsor
has private information on the talent of contest losers, which is valuable to
him. There is evidence for both cases. (i): In 2004, two finalists (that is
contest winners) signed record contracts with Universal Records in the Philip-
pines and Japan (Jasmine Trias) and with Motown Records (Camile Velasco),
competitors of the contest sponsor Sony/BMG.23 (ii): In 2005, singer Mario
Vazquez dropped out of the competition just days before the top 12’s first
(public) performance. This makes him a loser in the sense of the model. In Au-
gust 2005, Vazquez nevertheless signed a record contract with Arista Records,
also a subsidiary of Sony/BMG and also founded by Clive Davis, the founder
of J Records.24 Thus, a “loser” can still be attractive for the sponsor.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have characterized a mechanism, semi-public contests, that can
solve a dilemma occurring when entrepreneurs with ideas of uncertain value
and investors with the necessary complementary resources have to be matched.
I have shown the conditions under which such a contest exists in equilibrium
and that it only exists if it is efficient compared to private screening and no
screening, two alternatives mechanisms.
Consequently, as long as the assumption holds that there are no positive
spillovers from innovation on third parties, apart from entrepreneurs and in-
vestors, I can find no justification for direct government intervention in favor
of or against semi-public contests. In particular, this paper does not advocate
public funding of such contests. However, there is an indirect role for public pol-
icy. First, as existence of semi-public contests depends on active competition
among innovators, it is crucial that competition policy authorities safeguard
competitive markets. Second, as the semi-public contest mechanism has only
been used selectively in practice but could be used in many more fields (see
below), governments should promote its potential as an institution supporting
innovation. If more “investors” in many industries know about it, they might
not feel anymore that they are restricted to choosing between private screening
and no screening. This can lead to more efficient matches with “entrepreneurs”




More generally, the model presented in this paper can be applied to economic
situations that are characterized by a strong complementarity of inputs and a
high degree of hidden information on the value of one of the inputs (where even
the owner of this input does not know its true value). Furthermore, the initial
creation of the input’s value must depend on some kind of ability, talent, or
ingenuity of its creator—a notion of human capital—which can be tested by
screening. The input’s value should also be characterized by a high degree of
common value, such that investors face a high degree of price competition if
they share information about that value.
These conditions are regularly met in the context of innovation: an inventor
or innovator features the idea of a new, valuable product or process but often
requires financial resources and expertise on how to transform the initial idea
into a marketable product or service. Both private equity investors and public
patrons that are specializing in funding start-ups are typical “investors”.
The required conditions are also often met in an art or science context, in
which the “project” value is embodied in an artist’s talent or in a scientist’s ge-
nius. In such a situation, the artist or scientist often requires financial resources
and complementary knowledge of other artists or scientists to develop his tal-
ent or idea to its full value. Distributors of art or science, who are interested
in the development of a certain technology or in maximizing their profits by
contracting the artist’s human capital, can support financing and match him
with the right co-workers. They serve as “investors”. Section 4 has outlined
one example for each of these categories, business plan competitions and TV
casting shows. Ginsburgh and van Ours (2003) outline the case of a classical
music competition.
These characterizations may point on untested applications of the semi-
public contest mechanism. For instance, assume an employer faces a very
competitive labor market for certain highly skilled workers, say engineers or
software developers. Instead of increasing wages more and more, he could set
up a semi-public contest testing participants’ required capabilities. He could
invite several widely accepted industry experts to serve as jury judges and at-
tract many workers’ participation by making winning the contest sufficiently
attractive. As the best workers are most likely to win the contest, and the win-
ners would be publicized, competing employers would probably offer them high
salaries, thereby free-riding on the sponsor’s investment. However, the sponsor
could employ a row of second-best workers, about whose talent he gained inside
information, for relatively modest salaries, thereby making an economic profit.
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Appendix
A Robustness and Extensions
Multidimensional types of entrepreneurs and private values of in-
vestors: In this model an entrepreneur’s ability is only specified in one di-
mension captured by Z̃. In practice, entrepreneurs might be endowed with a
multidimensional type vector. For instance, in the case of TV Casting Shows,
one candidate may be better in singing, another one may be better in per-
forming live on stage. It can occur that one investor values one dimension
of entrepreneurs’ types higher but another investor values another dimension
higher. Related to multidimensional types, one investor may be better endowed
to create value from an entrepreneur’s project than another one, due to higher
complementarity of resources. This could lead to heterogenous values for a
certain project among investors.
Despite these caveats, there are two reasons to model unidimensional en-
trepreneur types and common values. The first is reduction of complexity. Mul-
tidimensional types lead to private or affiliated values among investors in the
final auction for an entrepreneur’s project, not to common values as assumed
here. Affiliated values create more complex bidding strategies; see Milgrom and
Weber (1982). This also complicates the analysis in stages one, two, and three
of the game. Moreover, multidimensional types require additional assumptions
to ensure well-behaving bidding functions because investors’ preferences may
not be single-peaked, anymore.
Most importantly, however, additional complexity would not deliver spec-
tacularly new insights. Assume that each entrepreneur i is characterized by
a two-dimensional type drawn from the joint distribution (Z̃, X̃). Moreover,
assume as a shortcut that one group of investors, named z, is only interested in
ability Z̃ whereas the other group, named x, is only interested in ability X̃. Let
an investor’s group affiliation be common knowledge. This would allow for two
sponsors of a given contest in equilibrium, one from each group of investors. In
the auction of a certain entrepreneur’s project each insider would bid a strat-
egy that takes into account both the bids of outsiders interested in the same
type-dimension (along the lines of Lemma 2) and the fact that there is another
insider interested in the second type-dimension.
For instance, assume that (Z̃, X̃) follows a uniform distribution in both
dimensions, where both Z̃ and X̃ have support [0, 20]. Insiders observe an
entrepreneur i’s ability vector (Zi, Xi) ≡ (12, 8). If there were no second insider,
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the z-insider would bid β(Zi = 12) = E[Z̃|Z̃ < Z] = 6, according to Lemma
2. The aggregate of z-outsiders would bid a mixed strategy based on a uniform
distribution over [0, E(Z̃)] = [0, 10]. Now let a second investor sponsor the
same contest and assume that he is from group x. An upper threshold for any
rational equilibrium bidding strategy of the entrant is β(Xi = 8) = 8. Thus, if
the z-insider bids 8 + ε instead of 6, the probability that he wins the auction
does not decrease compared to the situation without entrant but he still makes
a positive expected payoff because Zi = 12 > 8 + ε.25
It follows that the expected payoff from becoming an insider, which is crucial
for the contest equilibrium, has to be discounted by the probability of having
a higher valuation for the entrepreneur’s project than the second insider, who
is interested in the other type-dimension. This makes becoming a sponsor less
attractive for investors. The key result, however, that being an insider creates
an informational rent in the auction with respect to competing outside investors
interested in the same type-dimension, remains unchanged.
Noisy screening and publication of precise project values: What if the
jury cannot observe entrepreneurs’ project values perfectly but only observes
Ẑi = (Zi+ε), where ε is drawn from a distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2? The contest mechanism relies on the characteristic that exclusive inside
information is valuable for an investor because it leads to a positive expected
auction payoff. The cruder the correlation between the insider’s signal and the
real value of entrepreneurs’ projects is—that is the larger σ2—the lower is the
value of inside information. Thus, the upper threshold for existence of a semi-
public contest in equilibrium, k̂, decreases if σ2 increases. For sufficiently small
σ2, the quality of the above results remains the same.
Akin to this argumentation, the assumption was made that the jury pub-
licizes the precise project values of the winners, thereby allowing for Bertrand
competition among the investors in the final auction. In practice this may
hardly be possible due to incomplete knowledge of the jurors about the future.
Instead, the typical practical solution to this problem is to publicize a ranking
of winners, detailing who is the first, the second, ..., the nj ’th winner. As long
as the investors have some knowledge about the distribution of project values,
they can form (positively correlated) beliefs about the value of a given winning
project. As a consequence, contest winners can expect higher bids than contest
25Note that I do not claim that bidding 8 + ε is an equilibrium strategy but in equilibrium
the z-insider cannot do worse.
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losers and gain valuable reputation for their further careers. This may motivate
them to participate in a contest.
Endogenous publicity: The production of valuable reputation, where R >
0 is possible, depends on two factors: credibility and publicity. Credibility
is endogenous in this paper as the outsiders’ beliefs, that contest winners
have projects of high value, are confirmed in equilibrium. Publicity can be
endogenized by assuming that the sponsor of contest j bears total costs of
(Njk +K(Rj)), where K(Rj) is increasing in Rj and denotes the cost of mar-
keting the contest to investors and potentially to a wider audience. Then, a
contest sponsor has two tools, nj and Rj , to maximize his payoff, subject to
the demand and competitive constraints. This might explain why we observe
semi-public contests that create different reputation levels for winners in the
same industry.26 Because one tool of investors, nj , is sufficient for the results
of this paper to hold, there is no value added to endogenize publicity, though.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that at least one investor bids E(Z̃). Then, any b < E(Z̃) of another
investor will lose and generate zero expected payoff. Any b > E(Z̃) has a
positive probability of winning but conditional on winning creates E(π) < 0.
Q.E.D.
Sketch of Proof of Lemma 2
(i): See the proof of EMW, Theorem 1, for the case of atomless Z̃-distributions.27
(ii): The proof of EMW, Theorem 1, shows that E(πOUT ) = 0. The proof
of EMW, Theorem 4, shows that for any realization of Z̃ and any (m+1)-tuple
of bids, the seller’s revenue plus the insider’s profits in expected terms sum to
E(Z̃). According to EMW, Theorem 4, the distribution of E(Z̃) between the
seller and the inside bidder exclusively depends on the realization Zi that the
26In the case of business plan competitions, there are several contests that are targeting
the same set of entrepreneurs but are supported by different sponsors. See, http://www.
mootcorp.org/competitions.asp > Eligibility, for a list of competing business plan contests
that send their winners to the Moot Corp Competition in order to compete for even higher
reputation, amongst other prizes.
27Dubra (2006) shows that the original proof of uniqueness is slightly incorrect. He does
not criticize the validity of EMW, Theorem 1, though, and provides a correct proof instead.
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insider learns before bidding. Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping from Z̃ onto
θ(Z̃). This shows Lemma 2.(ii).28
Proof of Lemma 3
Preliminaries: The total derivative of (5) with respect to α̂j produces the fol-
lowing first-order condition (FOC):







Assumption 1 states that R is decreasing and convex in α. Hence, the same
holds with respect to α̂j . To understand how the average value of contest losers,
Zl, depends on α̂j note that, for α̂j = 0, all contest participants are losers.
Hence, limα̂j→0Zl = E(Z̃). For α̂j = 1, all contest participants are winners.
Hence, limα̂j→1Zl = 0. Because, by definition, increasing the expected share of
winners α̂j decreases Zn, the threshold value between winners and losers, and




At stage 3 of the game nj is fixed. Hence, α̂j can only decrease via increasing N̂j ,
the expected number of participants. With probability (1−α̂j)2 , a new participant
has value Z ∈ [0, Zl]. With probability
(1−α̂j)
2 , a new participant has value
Z ∈ (Zl, Zn]. These two effects on the expected level of Zl cancel out. With
probability α̂j , a new participant has value Z ∈ (Zn, Z̄], which increases Zn and,
hence, also increases Zl. Summarizing, the larger α̂j before a new participant
entered the contest, the larger the probability that his entry will have an effect




Proof: Because of (1) and (B.2), the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand
side (RHS) of (B.1) are positive for α̂j > 0. For α̂j → 1, by definition, R → 0,
28Note that Campbell and Levin (2000) criticize the result that the existence of an inside
bidder unambiguously decreases a seller’s revenue if compared to the case of symmetric bidder
information. They argue (p.107/8), “when bidders’ private information is affiliated, the public
release of a signal makes their information less private, prompting stronger competition. This is
the so-called ‘linkage effect.’ ” As in my model there is only one bidder with inside information
on a given project, there is no affiliated private information and, hence, no linkage effect. It
follows that the critique of Campbell and Levin does not apply to this model.
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hence Zl → 0 and (1− α̂j)→ 0; hence, LHS → 0. But in this case, dRdα̂j → −∞;
hence, RHS → +∞. It follows that, for α̂j → 1, LHS < RHS. In contrast, for
α̂j → 0, by definition, R > 0, hence Zl → E(Z̃) and dZldα̂j → 0; hence, LHS > 0,
whereas RHS → 0. It follows that, for α̂j → 0, LHS > RHS. Because R and
Zl are continuous and monotonic in α̂j , the median value theorem applies. It
follows that there exists a unique optimum of (5), at α∗.
The second-order condition (SOC) of (5) is given by:
dR
dα̂j



















Because of (1) and (B.2), the first three terms of (B.4) are negative. Because
of (B.3) and (B.2), the fourth term is also negative. Hence, SOC < 0. It follows
that the optimum of (5) at α∗ is a maximum. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
(i): Abstracting from development cost Di and following Lemma 1, an en-
trepreneur expects E(Z̃) if there is no screening. Following Lemma 2, he expects
θE(Z̃)− c < E(Z̃) from private screening. Private screening is also dominated
by a semi-public contest if, drawing on (4):
α̂j [R+ Zw] + (1− α̂j)[θZl]− c > θE(Z̃)− c. (B.5)
By using E(Z̃) = α̂jZw + (1− α̂j)Zl, this can be rewritten as:
α̂j(R+ (1− θ)Zw) > 0, (B.6)
which holds ∀ α̂j > 0.
(ii): An entrepreneur prefers a semi-public contest over no screening if:
α̂j [R+ Zw] + (1− α̂j)[θZl]− c ≥ E(Z̃) (B.7)
⇔ α̂jR ≥ c+ (1− α̂j)(1− θ)Zl. (B.8)
Lemma 3 implies that the expected utility from contest participation is
hump-shaped in α̂j . As the expected utility from no screening is independent of
α̂j , it implies that (B.8) holds with equality either for two α̂j-levels or for one or
for none. To see this note that in a contest, according to (B.7), limα̂j→0E(πi) =
θE(Z̃)− c and that limα̂j→1E(πi) = Zw(α̂j = 1)− c = E(Z̃)− c. Both values
are smaller than E(Z̃). Hence, if E(πi|α∗) > E(Z̃), which depends on the
distribution of R and on Z̃ and on c, all of which are well defined, (B.8) holds
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with equality for α and ᾱ, as defined in (6). These two levels converge in α∗
for E(πi|α∗) = E(Z̃). Hence:
0 < α ≤ α∗ ≤ ᾱ < 1. (B.9)
It follows that ∀α̂j ∈ [α, ᾱ], entrepreneurs prefer participation in contest j over
no screening, as long as E(πi(α∗)) ≥ E(Z̃). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
(i): Consider a pure strategy of entrepreneur i, according to which he par-
ticipates in some contest j with probability one. The marginal impact of i’s
participation in contest j on α̂j depends on the expected number of other par-







Hence, in a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium every i will make the
same unique choice and participate in the contest such that E(πi) in that contest
is maximized. This creates larger expected utility for i than under no screening





∈ [α, ᾱ], (B.11)
which is possible for R(njN ) sufficiently high or c sufficiently low. Given that
(B.11) holds and entrepreneur i deviates unilaterally from choosing j, say by
participating in contest s, he will be the only candidate there. Hence, α̂s = 1,
and the reputation benefit is R(α̂s = 1) = 0, which creates an expected payoff
strictly less than from participating in j. Thus, in a unique symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium every entrepreneur participates in the same contest
j.
(ii): Let φj be the probability that entrepreneur i assigns to participation in
each contest j that offers nj ≥ 1 winning slots. Let Φ : φj → j ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}
be the associated mixed strategy of i for all contests. Contests without winning
slots are not regarded (φj(nj = 0) = 0). (B.10) shows that the marginal effect
of i’s entry on the winning probability in contest j decreases in the expected
number of other participants, N̂j . In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
the strategy Φ of each of the other N−1 entrepreneurs has to make entrepreneur
i indifferent between participating in this or in that contest, independent of
the total number of contests, Q, and independent of the number of winning
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slots in a contest, nj , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. This is accomplished if the expected ex
post winning probability in contest j, i.e. assuming that i participates in j,
is equal ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. Recall that this probability is defined as α̂j ≡ njN̂j+1
with N̂j = φj(N − 1) as the expected number of entrepreneurs other than i
participating in j.
The mixed strategy equilibrium can be found by solving the following system
of Q equations, where j and s are two arbitrary contests:
nj
φj(N − 1) + 1
=
ns
φs(N − 1) + 1
∀s ∈ {1, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., Q},(B.12)
Q∑
q=1
φq = 1. (B.13)
(B.12) statesQ−1 indifference conditions: the winning probability njφj(N−1)+1
that i faces after his entry in one of the Q contests must be the same in ev-
ery single contest. (B.13) closes the equation system by stating that all entry
probabilities that i assigns to the Q contests must sum up to one. There are Q
unknown variables, {φ1, ..., φQ}, and Q equations. The solution to the system
is given by φ∗j , as stated in Lemma 5.(ii). To see this, substitute φ
∗
j for φj and





∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. (B.14)
It follows that, if the other N −1 entrepreneurs play Φ(φ∗j ), i cannot change
his expected utility from contest participation whatever strategy he plays. It
follows that Φ(φ∗j )∀i constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that
Lemma 5.(i) characterizes the special case of 5.(ii) for Q = 1.
Uniqueness: Assume a symmetric mixed strategy that puts a weight φ′j > φ
∗
j
on participation in one contest, j. Due to (B.13), this implies a reduction
of the participation probability in another contest, s 6= j: φ′s < φ∗s. Thus,
α̂j < α̂s, which makes either j or s more attractive for all other entrepreneurs.
However, because of the different marginal effects of entry (by nj and by N̂j)
on the winning probability α̂j , see (B.10), the only alternative equilibrium is





N /∈ [α, ᾱ], Lemma 5.(i) rules out this alternative and Φ(φ
∗
j )∀i
is the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
Asymmetric mixed strategies or beliefs: Note that it is possible to con-
struct multiple asymmetric Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, in which one
entrepreneur i assigns a higher probability φ′j > φ
∗
j to one contest and a lower
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probability φ′s < φ
∗
s to another contest, and another entrepreneur g 6= i does the
reverse. If deviations from φ∗j are symmetric, such that, from the perspective of
i, α̂j is the same ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}, this strategy combination constitutes a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this requires some coordination among the
entrepreneurs: who participates in which contest with which probability. Al-
ternatively, asymmetric beliefs among the entrepreneurs about the other N − 1
entrepreneurs’ behavior could also support an asymmetric mixed strategy equi-
librium, as long as α̂j is the same ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Q}. However, the question
arises where such balancing asymmetric beliefs should come from among ex
ante identical players. Therefore, I perceive the concept of symmetric mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium as more appropriate for this model.
Finally, Φ(φ∗j ) dominates no screening only if α̂j(φ
∗
j ) ∈ [α, α̂]; see Lemma
4.(ii). Q.E.D.
Illustration: Consider the following example. Assume there are N = 50
entrepreneurs who face Q = 5 contests, named {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, which offer the
following number of winning slots: n1 = 2, n2 = 3, n3 = 5, n4 = 8, n5 = 9.
Φ(φ∗j ) dictates that every entrepreneur participates in the contests with























q = 1; hence (B.13) holds. Substituting values in α̂j =
nj
φj(N−1)+1 results in α̂j =
1
2 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Hence, every i cannot change
the expected winning probability that he faces after entry despite the fact that
the number of winning slots is different across the five contests. Consequently,
i cannot increase his expected utility by deviating from Φ(φ∗j ).






50 . This is due to the fact that α̂j
simulates i’s participation in every contest, whereas 1N
∑Q
q=1 nq captures the
“objective” expected winning probability, given that every i can just enter one
contest.
Proof of Lemma 6
(9) depends on Q in three ways: via φ∗j , via
∑Q
q=1 nq, and via Zl(α̂j(φ
∗
j )).
Ceteris paribus, if there is one additional contest offered, say contest q, the





= nq ≥ 1. (B.15)










































N((1− θ)Zl(α̂j(φ∗j ))− k)
) dφ∗j
dQ




Due to (B.18) and Assumption 3, the first term of (B.19) is negative. It follows
from (9) that, in order to avoid losses, an investor must offer less winning slots
than the expected number of participants in his contest: nj < φ∗jN . Because
of this and (B.17), the second term of (B.19) is negative, too. It follows that:
dE(πj)
dQ
< 0 ∀j Q.E.D. (B.20)
Proof of Proposition 1
(i): Assumption 3 and Definition 5 imply that contests can only exist in equi-
librium if k ≤ k̄∧c ≤ c̄j . When is exactly one contest offered? Two possibilities
exist to rule out more than one contest in equilibrium. First, assume that two
contests, 1 and 2, are organized and entrepreneur i unilaterally participates in
both of them whereas all other entrepreneurs only participate in one contest
each. Investors 1 and 2 would obtain the same information on Zi. Thus, i
would expect perfectly competitive bidding and a payoff of:
E(Z̃) + α̂1R1 + α̂2R2 − 2c. (B.21)
If he participates in contest 1 only, he expects a payoff according to (5) with
j = 1. Combining these two functions reveals that an entrepreneur prefers
participation in two contests over one if and only if:
c ≤ α̂2R2 + (1− α̂1)(1− θ)Zl ≡ ĉ. (B.22)
If i participates in two contests, however, bidding is very competitive and the
expected investor payoff from screening reduces to −k. It follows that, given
investor 1 already entered the market, investor 2 has no incentive to enter and
will not organize a contest, too, if (B.22) holds.
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If c > ĉ, it is still possible that exactly one contest is offered in equilibrium.
Substituting (7) in (9) for j = 2, and rearranging the FOC of this expression
with respect to n2 yields investor 2’s best-response function depending on the
number of winning slots set by investor 1:
n2(n1) =
√
n1N(N2 − 1)(1− θ)Zl((1− θ)Zl − k)
(N − 1)(1− θ)Zl
− n1. (B.23)
Substituting (B.23) in (9) for j = 2 produces investor 2’s expected Stackelberg
follower payoff from offering a contest and depending on n1:
(n1(N − 1) +N2)(1− θ)Zl − kN2 − 2
√
n1N(N2 − 1)(1− θ)Zl((1− θ)Zl − k)
N − 1
.(B.24)
If the Stackelberg leader can set n1 such that (B.24) is negative, investor 2 will
not enter. Inspecting the first-order and second-order conditions of (B.24) with
respect to n1 reveals that (B.24) has a well-defined minimum level, which leads
to a negative expected Stackelberg follower payoff.29 Solving (B.24) for zero

















n1 and n̄1 are investor 1’s competitive constraints when maximizing his own
expected payoff. Both decrease in k. In addition, investor 1 has to make sure
that the two demand constraints defined in Lemma 5 hold forQ = 1: n1N ∈ [α, ᾱ].
If and only if the intervals (n1, n̄1) and [αN, ᾱN ] overlap, then n ≤ n̄.30
Given the competitive constraints hold, it follows that Q = 1 and, thus,
φ∗1 = 1; see (7). Hence, investor 1 maximizes (N − n1)(1 − θ)Zl − Nk, which
yields, by total differentiation:
dE(π1(Q = 1))
dn1




By definition, dα̂1dn1 > 0; by (B.2),
dZl
dα̂1
< 0. It follows that dZldn1 < 0. Hence,
dE(π1(Q=1))
dn1
< 0 as long as the demand constraints hold, too. This implies that
29The calculations are standard and omitted for the sake of brevity.
30Note that whether n ≤ n̄, or vice versa, depends on the parameter realizations. Since n1
and n̄1 (but not αN and ᾱN) depend on k and only αN and ᾱN (but not n1 and n̄1) depend
on R(α) and c, both cases are possible. It would not add value to the main contribution of
this paper, which is to show that semi-public contests can exist in equilibrium, to specify the
threshold levels of k, R(α), or c.
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investor 1 sets n1 to the lowest level that lets all constraints hold, i.e. to set
n1 = n. When does this lead to nonnegative expected payoff for investor 1?
First, assume the lower competitive constraint is binding: n = n1. Substi-
tuting (B.25) in investor 1’s expected payoff function,
E(π1(Q = 1, n1)) = (N − n1)(1− θ)Zl −Nk, (B.28)
setting it equal to zero, and rearranging yields that E(π1(Q = 1, n1)) ≥ 0 ∀k ≤
(1− θ)Zl. Due to Assumption 3 this holds for all valid parameter values.
Second, assume the lower demand constraint is binding: n = αN . Substi-
tuting this in (B.28), setting it equal to zero, and rearranging yields that
E(π1(Q = 1, αN)) ≥ 0 ∀k ≤
(R(α)− c)(1− θ)Zl
R(α) + (1− θ)Zl)
≡ k̄, (B.29)
where k̄ is increasing in R(α) and decreasing in c. Whether k̄ is smaller or
larger than k̄ depends on the realizations of R, c, and Z̃. Which of the two
lower constraints is binding, i.e. whether n1 is larger or smaller than αN , also
depends on the realizations of the parameters. As can easily be seen from (6),
αN increases in c and decreases in R(α). Hence, the larger R(α) or the smaller
c, the smaller the probability that the demand constraint is binding.
If investor 1 offers a contest, satisfying the competitive constraints makes
sure the best-response of investor 2 (and subsequent investors) is not to offer a
contest. If investor 1 does not offer a contest because k is too large, all other
investors have the same incentives not to do so since they are identical ex ante.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
At stage 1, all parameter realizations that are relevant to determine the equi-
libria in stages 2, 3, and 4 are common knowledge. Hence, all players can
determine the equilibrium number of contests and contest slots.
Investor j knows that the probability that he is determined by nature to act
as the first investor in stage 2 is 1m+1 . Given the conditions in Proposition 1.(i)
hold, he will organize a contest and expect a payoff of (N − n∗)(1− θ)Zl −Nk
in this case. If there are two contests offered in equilibrium, investor j expects
(φ∗1N−n∗1)(1−θ)Zl−φ∗1Nk with probability 1m+1 and (φ
∗
2N−n∗2)(1−θ)Zl−φ∗2Nk
with probability 1m . In general, if the profitable existence of Q contests can be








Hence, investor j enters the market if and only if:
F ≤ F̄ ≡
Q∑
q=1
(φ∗qN − n∗q)(1− θ)Zl − φ∗qNk
m+ 2− q
> 0. (B.31)
Entrepreneur i’s security value is his payoff from no screening, E(Z̃). In
case one or more contests are offered in equilibrium, which implies that en-
























j )) ≥ E(Z̃). The latter inequality holds
strictly if the lower demand constraint is not binding.
It follows that i develops his idea into a project if and only if:
Di ≤ D̄i ≡ Eπi(α̂∗j (φ∗j )). Q.E.D. (B.33)
Proof of Proposition 3
The benchmark solution with which each mechanism has to be compared is
market breakdown, which yields welfare WBD = 0. Define NNS (and NPS)
as the number of entrepreneurs whose development cost in expectation is not
larger than E(Z̃) (not larger than θE(Z̃)−c). It follows that NPS < NNS < N .
Assuming that projects are developed, in the no screening and private screening
cases, welfare is:
WNS = NNS(E(Z̃)−Di)− (m+ 1)F. (B.34)
WPS = NPS(E(Z̃)−Di − c− k)− (m+ 1)F. (B.35)
Clearly, WNS > WPS . Define NSPC as the number of entrepreneurs whose
development cost in expectation is not larger than than E(Z̃) + α̂∗jR − (1 −
α̂∗j )(1 − θ)Zl − c. Because of Corollary 3, NSPC > NNS if the lower demand
constraint is not binding and NSPC = NNS if it is binding. Welfare in the
contest case is:
WSPC = NSPC(E(Z̃) + α̂∗jR−Di − c− k)− (m+ 1)F. (B.36)
Because of Corollary 3, entrepreneurs and investors are never worse off in a
contest if it exists but in many cases they are better off. Hence, in expectation,
WSPC > WNS . Q.E.D.
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